One of the main problems for the French military in Indochina was an acute manpower shortage. Especially as they were forbidden to use French conscripts by successive French home governments, this difficulty became more grave as time went on. The Foreign Legion was the most important source of Europeans, and the African colonies provided significant numbers of men, but it was never enough. As time went on and casualties mounted, increasing numbers of Indochinese troops were brought into the TFEO, or organised into "national" units, but for various reasons this large reserve was never tapped efficiently. However, the aim here is to describe the Indochinese men and units which did serve to support the French administration - as can be seen, not all these peoples were anti-French!

There had been Indochinese troops in French service since 1859, and after the Japanese interlude, many of the previous tirailleurs returned to French service. The French initially used the Indochinese personnel mainly as coolies and other workers, and in the militia/guard units used to man static positions along the main roads, rivers and other communication routes. Some formed partisan units either acting alone (as in Touby Li Foung's Hmong guerrillas in Laos) or attached to regular units as scouts (which was particularly the case with the Legion and Paras). As time passed,however, Indochinese personnel were brought into nominally European or African units to replace losses. Some supposedly "white" units were 50% Indochinese by the middle years of the war.

Pre-WW2, the French had recruited mainly from the "Annamese" population of the Vietnamese provinces (Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchine). The Khmer and Lao were supposedly pacifistic buddhists, and so not thought to be suitable for military service, though their later activity seems hardly pacifistic! Hill tribes (the famous montagnards) such as the Thô and Meo of Tonkin or the Hmong of Laos had been used as auxiliaries (trackers/scouts or militias) in the pre-WW2 period, and continued to be used in this rôle during the Indochina War.

After the Japanese takeover of 9th March 1945, the old French colonial military structure was demolished. The French troops were interned, executed, or in China, while the Indochinese personnel either served under the Japanese or went home. Many joined the ranks of the Viet Minh.

When the Indochina War started in 1946, the French forces consisted almost entirely of French and North African troops, with Indochinese present as coolies, service personnel or fighting auxilliaries. As the war escalated, the Indochinese proportion increased dramatically. General Leclerc realised the need to recruit Vietnamese partisans, and General Salan got this in motion. In a memo to all battalions of 14th November 1947, he asked for the maximum use of Indochinese personnel to fill the gaps in French units. While many Indochinese were recruited, there was no real system to this.

In Tonkin, the auxilliaries came from the following sources:

• Vietnamese who had suffered at the hands of the VM

• Vietnamese christians

• Ethnic minorities (Thai, Nung, Meo, Hmong, Thô, Man, etc.) who were generally hostile to the Viet majority.

• Pro-French Vietnamese

• Some of the captive VM (prisonniers et internés militaires - PIM) who, having worked as coolies for the CEFEO, decided to join the French side and fight against their previous comrades.

Formation of the Armée Nationale Vietnamienne

Initially, the Armée Nationale Vietnamienne (Vietnamese National Army - ANV) was formed by transferring Indochinese units from the TFEO to the new force. This included the Vietnamese battalions from Colonial regiments,Vietnamese battalions and companies which had been attached to Legion units, and the bawouans - the Indochinese paratroop battalions. These hardened units tended to be the élite around which the rest of the ANV was formed.

On the 15th July 1951, General de Lattre convinced the fledgling Vietnamese Government to order a general mobilisation of the new ANV - i.e. conscription in Vietnam. Unfortunately this did not quite work as planned. Large numbers of the conscripts did not turn up, and many of those who did proved to be unfit for service. However, the ANV did increase from 65,000 men in January 1951, to 128,000 by December of that year. (In the same period the Cambodian troops went from 5,000 to 10,500, and the Laos forces from 4,000 to 9,500).

To provide the Vietnamese officers required by this new army, de Lattre set up the École Militaire Inter-armes (Combined Military Academy) at Dalat (the "St Cyr of Indochina"), together with Regional Military Academies. During 1951, some 800 Vietnamese officers joined the ANV. The quality of the ANV units varied enormously. Some officers and NCOs - particularly in the ex-Legion, ex-Colonial or para units, were efficient and effective, but many were political appointées with no real interest in the army. Units ranged from tough and resiliant formations the equal of anything in the CEFEO, to ineffective ones which deserted en masse. There were also significant numbers of VM agents in the ranks of the ANV...

The ANV in 1952

In his book "Soldats de la boue - La bataille du Tonkin", Roger Delpey gives an account of the ANV at the start of 1952, on which the following is heavily based:

Effectives:

• Regular Army: on 1st January 1952, some 60-65,000 men, with a massive recruitment programme planned for the year.

• Auxiliaries: some 60,000 (excluding partisans), of which about 1/10th were paid by the Vietnamese Government(mainly Caodaists and Hoa-Hao).

• Infantry: 36 battalions.

• Armour: 3 reconnaissance squadrons.

• Artillery: 2 batteries.

• Engineers: 3 companies.

• Signals: 4 companies.

• Support: 2 supply companies, 4 repair companies (plus depots), 1 medical company (plus regional medical services and depots), plus regional administration centres.

• École Militaire Inter-armes (Dalat): 200 every 9 months.

• Regional Military Academies (Hanoi, Hue and Saigon): in total, these turned out 300 officer cadets and 300 NCOs every 8 months.

• Écoles d'officiers de Réserve (Reserve Officers Academy - Thu Duc and Nam Dinh): intended to produce 500 reserve officers, but in fact turned out 690 after an 8 month course.

• 400 from the EMI (Dalat)

• 300 from the Regional Academies

• 600 Reserve officers

• Heavy weapons (particularly artillery)

• Small-arms for 35 battalions and Divisional troops

• 6000 rifles for the Guard

Armée Nationale Laotienne (Laos National Army):

• 4 Infantry battalions.

• 1 Parachute battalion.

• 36 commando companies of the Guard.

Armée Royale Khmère (Royal Khmer Army):

• 6 Light Infantry battalions.

• 1 Reconnaissance squadron (including a river flotilla).

• 1 Parachute squadron.

• 1 Engineer company.

• 15 Infantry companies.

• The Corps franc Khmer (light troops).

General Nguyen Van Hinh as Chief-of-Staff

• Manpower: 625 effectives, as opposed to 820
• Weaponry: use of the Thompson SMG instead of rifles, and 60mm mortars instead of 81mm.

• Vietnam: 70,000 men (of which 35,000 regulars)
• Cambodia: 5,500 men
• Laos: 4,000 men

• Vietnam: 135,000 men (of which 65,000 regulars)
• Cambodia: 11,000 men
• Laos: 10,000 men

• Vietnam: 200,000 men (of which 150,000 regulars)
• Cambodia: 11,000 men
• Laos: 15,000 men